Tulsa Law Review
Volume 46
Issue 1 Symposium: Catharine MacKinnon
Fall 2010

Toward a Feminist Theory of Justice: Political liberalism and
Feminist Method
Lori Watson

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Lori Watson, Toward a Feminist Theory of Justice: Political liberalism and Feminist Method, 46 Tulsa L.
Rev. 35 (2013).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol46/iss1/7

This Legal Scholarship Symposia Articles is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Tulsa Law Review by an authorized editor of TU Law Digital Commons. For
more information, please contact megan-donald@utulsa.edu.

Watson: Toward a Feminist Theory of Justice: Political liberalism and Fem

TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF JUSTICE:
POLITICAL LIBERALISM AND FEMINIST METHOD'
Lori Watson*

In Toward a Feminist Theory of the State, MacKinnon develops a substantive
critique of the liberal state, including a critique of its reliance on the "objective stance"
that, in her view, theoretically blinds liberalism from addressing substantive gender
inequality.2 Moreover, she develops an account of the feminist method where theorizing
about justice and equality is grounded in an understanding of actual lived experience of
inequality and injustice that women, in particular, face. In others words, she argues: if we
want to respond to the particular forms that gender inequality takes, we must first
understand those manifestations in their particulars and our theory of justice (or equality)
needs to be constructed so as to address injustice as it actually occurs here and now. Put
differently, theory must be built from the bottom up not the top down. In this paper, I
will explore the extent to which this criticism attaches to a version of political liberalism
that emphasizes reciprocity as the core normative notion for political legitimacy. I will
argue that political liberalism (as one form of liberalism) does not rely on the
objectionable form of objectivity that MacKinnon calls out. However, this fact alone
does not serve to forestall the deeper objection that underlies MacKinnon's points. Her
objection goes much deeper and calls into question the methodology of doing "ideal
theory" (as Rawls situates his view of justice as fairness). I develop this criticism, and
conclude that political liberalism can avoid MacKinnon's criticisms on one level, but
they resurface if one accepts the methodology of "justice as fairness" as the correct
methodology for determining principles of justice.
WHY POLITICAL LIBERALISM?
In order to motivate the analysis that follows, it is worth asking: if securing
substantive sex equality is a fundamental concern, then, in light of MacKinnon's
criticisms, why continue to try to defend a version of liberalism at all? Arguably among

* Lori Watson, Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University of San Diego.
1. This paper was inspired by a conversation I had with Catharine MacKinnon sitting on a bench in the
"Garden by the Sea" at the University of San Diego. It was one of many, many moments where something
Catharine said lead to an "a-ha" moment for me. I thank her for being the consummate professor in this way. I
also would like to thank Christie Hartley for providing comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
2. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 83-125, 157-70 (1989)
[hereinafter MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE].
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the most important of Rawls's insights is the identification of a problem of legitimacy
that modem democracies face. Political legitimacy, in a democratic state, requires some
form of agreement (or consent) among all citizens to what is inevitably the coercive
power of the state. 3 Yet democratic institutions (ideally) secure the conditions for
freedom of conscious and thought equally for all citizens. Under conditions of freedom
of conscious, citizens will inevitably develop diverse and irreconcilable conceptions of
value and hence diverse conceptions of the good life. Thus, democratic institutions, by
their very nature, promote pluralism. Moreover, given humanity's differing conceptions
of value and limitations in reaching unified judgments over ordering such values, there
will be a range of views which are reasonable and none of which is definitively
superior. Thus, democratic institutions will necessarily give rise to what Rawls calls
"the fact of reasonable pluralism." 5 This insight frames the work of political liberalism
and resituates the task of the political philosopher.
The pressing question for the political philosopher becomes: how is it possible to
create fair terms of social cooperation among persons conceived of as free and equal
citizens given that they are deeply divided over fundamental values? 6 Rawls allows that
it is quite possible that we cannot. (FN) However, failing to show the possibility of a
just, legitimate democratic state would entail that we resign ourselves to the fact that
state (political) power is always oppressive. 7 We need not be thus resigned, however.
The bulk of PoliticalLiberalism is spent trying to show that democratic legitimacy, and
hence justice, is possible despite the fact that citizens will accept different
comprehensive doctrines. Rawls proposes that in light of the fact of reasonable
pluralism, we must seek a political conception of justice and eschew appeals to
comprehensive doctrines in the course of our deliberations with other citizens. Instead,
citizens must rely on public reasons to justify political conceptions of justice and basic
political principles.
A citizen engages in public reason, then, when he or she deliberates within a framework of
what he or she sincerely regards as the most reasonable political conception of justice, a
conception that expresses political values that others, as free and equal citizens might also
reasonably be expected reasonably to endorse.8
Rawls, of course, defends his particular theory of justice, "justice as fairness," as the
most reasonable. 9 However, the two concepts do come apart. One could accept political
liberalism and reject justice as fairness as the best articulation of justice. I will explore
this point more in what follows. For now, I simply want to motivate the need for
developing a defensible version of political liberalism; modem democracies are
constituted by deep, yet reasonable pluralism and hence no comprehensive conception of

3. Here I leave open what precise form of consent is required.
4. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 54-58 (1993).

5. Id. at 4.
6. See id. at 3.
7. See id. at 37. Rawls notes that failing to accommodate reasonable pluralism will require the oppressive
use of state force. He calls this "the fact of oppression." Id.
8. John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, in JOHN RAWLS: COLLECTED PAPERS 573, 581
(Samuel Freeman ed., 1999).
9. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) [hereinafter RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE].
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justice is possible without the oppressive use of state force, hence, a political conception
of justice is our best hope for the possibility of a legitimate democracy. Next, I turn to
MacKinnon's critique of liberalism per se in order to see in what ways her criticisms
may attach to political liberalism.
MACKINNON'S CRITIQUE OF THE LIBERAL STATE

The core of MacKinnon's critique of the liberal state lies in a critique of the way in
which liberalism incorporates an "objective stance" into its account of political
justification.' 0 In so doing, the liberal state is "male." 11 In order to understand this claim,
we need to unpack MacKinnon's critique of male power. As I read MacKinnon, the
liberal state - and more specifically liberal jurisprudence as practiced in the liberal state
- is gendered male in the sense that it relies on a particular notion of objectivity that
sees social categories as justified, and hence rationally employed, insofar as they
"accurately" describe and map so-called "natural" categories.
In order to begin to spell out MacKinnon's view of male power, I want to
distinguish between "exercises of power" and "forms of power." Start with the latter: a
form of power combines legitimation with force.12 An exercise of power may simply be
an instance of relying on a particular form of power to justify a particular act of
domination. There is another sense of exercises of power that does not rely on an
underlying form of power for justification. We might refine this sense by calling it a
"brute-exercise of power." Some examples will help here. Suppose I want something you
have, and to get it, I use as much physical force as necessary to take it from you. Here I
have used brute physical force (power) to take what I want. This is an instance of a
"brute exercise of power" marked by a blanket use of force. Contrast this with what I
might now call an "authoritative exercise of power."
Altering the example above, suppose that you are the library and the something I
want is a book, and my method for getting it involves not physical force but a library
card. The library, personified as you, determines that in order to get a library card I must
show proper identification and be a member of the relevant community (the University,
for example). Having met the relevant criteria and having been issued a library card, you
allow me to check out the book. Keeping with the personification within the example,
you (as the library) have exercised power over me insofar as you determined the
conditions required for borrowing books and determine whether I met those conditions. I
have also exercised power (we might say I was empowered by the library via my library
card) over the library insofar as I have gotten the book that I want. This we can call an
authoritative exercise of power. What distinguishes it from the brute exercise of power?
One difference to fix on is the use of physical force in the one example and not the other,
but this is not the point of contrast I wish to focus on for, as will become clear, some
authoritative exercises of power involve the use of physical force. 13

10.

See generally MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 2.

11. Id. at 162.
12. Id. at 122.
13. For example, the use of force by the police or state will be authoritative exercises of power on this
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What distinguishes brute exercises of power from authoritative exercises of power
is their relation to an authorizing form of power. A form of power is an ideological
construct through which particular exercises of power are authorized or not. A theory of
a form of power, then, provides an account of the origin of legitimation or authorization
of the use of force (here force is broadly construed as compel to comply whether it be by
physical or non-physical means). So, to return to the examples above, a typical reaction
to the example where I used physical force to take what I wanted from you might be:
"You have no right to do that!" Or to put it in terms now being introduced: "You have no
authority to take that!" To characterize the taking as a brute exercise of power is to point
out that there is no legitimating form of power to support the action. Contrast the library
book example: if one were to ask, "What gives you the authority (here read as right) to
take that book?" the reply would be: "Well, the library allowed me to check it out." To
characterize my borrowing the book as an authoritative exercise of power is to say that it
has the support of a form of power. That is, the library has legitimate authority to
determine the use conditions of its books. What confers legitimate authority will vary
across forms of power. But to underscore the main point: what distinguishes something
as a form of power is that it has a legitimation story, if you will. Now, this is not to say
that all forms of power are themselves legitimate. Forms of power may be just or unjust.
One can understand the central point of MacKinnon's work and critique as trying to
show that male power is itself an unjust form of power. What characterizes male power
as a form of power? From where does it gain its authority?
There are three distinctions to keep in mind and to keep separate as we discuss
male power: what it is, what it does, and from where it gains its authority. Essentially
male power is the power of men to exert control over the lives of women. Male power is
not solely the power of external force, as represented in the statement "A exerted power
over B." Male power is a constructive power: it is a power that constructs the
subjectivities of men and women through the normative constructs of masculinity and
femininity. As the norms of masculinity and femininity are constructed and reinforced by
male domination, male power becomes a power to produce both perspective and reality.
MacKinnon puts the point in the following way: "Power to create the world from one's
point of view, particularly from the point of view of one's pleasure, is power in its male
form.,, 14
Male power gains its authority and legitimacy insofar as the world confirms its
picture of gender, its picture of how men and women are. So, at the same time that male
power constructs the subjectivities of men and women, it is self-confirming. Men and
women turn out to be as they are described from the perspective of male power. The
process of self-confirmation, if you will, then appears to be objective because the
determinants are hidden from view. For example, men are thought to excel at specific
activities such as standardized testing or sports more than women, as they often do, and
men as a group are found to excel at demanding professions such as the medical
profession or the legal profession at a higher rate than women. Now, in absence of a
analysis. I avoided using such examples for purposes of this distinction in order to avoid muddying the waters
early on.
14.

MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 2, at 121.
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critique and understanding the way in which male power produces those realities, in
other words looked at from a distanced and aperspectival approach, those realities may
just seem to show superior "natural" capabilities of men or may appear as merely
innocuous happenstance. From the position of male power, then, pointing out the
differences found between men and women will often simply confirm the superiority of
males. Rather than revealing the processes by which males have come to have power and
continue to have power over women, finding "differences" between men and women
supports the picture of the world that maintains male power.
The final pieces of the puzzle require making three points clear: first, that
objectivity, as a norm of legitimation, is implicated in the maintenance of sex inequality.
Second, liberalism, especially in its approach to sex equality, relies on this conception of
objectivity. Finally, this conception of objectivity as rationality and male power rely on
the same form of power. In other words, liberal rationality, especially as seen in the
context of legal approaches to sex equality, and male power rely on the same form of
power for their authority or legitimacy. MacKinnon puts the point as follows: "The state
is male jurisprudentially, meaning that it adopts the standpoint of male power on the
relation between law and society." 15 That standpoint is: the legitimacy of categories of
classification (legal or gender classifications) is grounded in the extent to which these
categories accurately map "the world" the way it is.
The objective stance, a particular epistemic approach, "erects two tests to which its
method must conform: distance and aperspectivity." 1 6 Social knowledge within the
objective stance is that which accurately represents the world as untainted by one's
subjectivity. There is a division between the world out there (reality) and the world in
here (mind); to have knowledge in here (in the mind) is to accurately represent/mirror
what is out there (reality). The world out there is taken as a given, as constituting the set
of background facts. 17 The set of background facts are what they are, we may come to
know them, we may not, but our knowing them or not knowing them does not affect
what they are.18
We are now in a position to see the problem with liberal political philosophy's
(and jurisprudence's) approach, insofar as it is committed to a formal model of equality,
to questions of sex (in)equality. The problem is with its uncritical incorporation of the
objective stance into its account of rationality and this particular rationality test."1 9 What
will count as rational on this view is that which accurately maps reality (or the set of
background facts). Background facts themselves are taken to be the raw data that
constitutes the way the world is. The problem is that this view of rationality as
objectivity represents a particular approach to the significance and legitimacy of social
categories; however, it represents itself as a neutral and unbiased approach.
Anthony Laden reads MacKinnon's critique of liberal objectivity as primarily

15. Id. at 163.
16. Id. at 97.

17. See generally Anthony Simon Laden, RadicalLiberals, Reasonable Feminists: Reason, Power and
Objectivity in MacKinnon and Rawls, 11 J. POL. PHIL. 133, 137-43 (2003) ("Background facts" is Anthony
Laden's term).
18. See generally id.
19. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEX EQUALITY 219 (2001) [hereinafter MACKINNoN, SEX EQUALITY].
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targeted at a form of political justification of which the liberal conception of objectivity
is a subset. 20 He calls this form of political justification "rationality as objectivity."21
What is at stake here is the way in which a theory takes certain pre-political (i.e.,
background) facts to be related to political facts or categories. MacKinnon refers to this
method as the "mirror method." What she is referring to is the way in which liberal
jurisprudence aims to justify classifications for the purpose of the law. Those
classifications that "adequately" mirror reality are permissible "from the moral point of
view"; they are permissible because insofar as they mirror reality they can be given a
rational justification and thus are non-arbitrary. They are rationally grounded. What this
method misses is that the social reality of gender itself is the product of power relations.
Laden puts the critical point in the following way: "Rationality as objectivity relies
on a distinction between . . . social facts and . . . 'background' facts. It takes justification
of reliance on social facts to involve connecting them to background facts."22 So, in
terms of the U.S. constitutional law with regard to sex equality, using sex as proxy for
legal classifications is permissible (rational) if and only if the social fact (legal status)
adequately maps gender-based distinctions that are taken as pre-political (background
facts) about persons. "According to the social ontology on which rationality as
objectivity rests, background facts are primary." 2 3 Here we can now make more clear
what MacKinnon means by "the mirror method." Social categories/distinctions are
justifiable on this view to the extent that they adequately mirror the set of background
facts. Background facts are primary then because they are the representation against
which we try to mirror social distinctions. Within rationality as objectivity, then, we can
measure the rationality (read here as 'legitimacy') of our set of social distinctions by how
tightly they map the relevant background facts. Where we are using sex as a social
distinction (or basis of legal classification), it must be the case that the rule's intended
purpose is to pick out members of a specific sex and that that purpose has a substantial
rational basis (i.e., is grounded in a real difference). Because of wide individual variation
among persons and gender characteristics, this approach pushes toward gender
neutrality. Sex characteristics tend to be both over- and under-inclusive, and so will
rarely form a rational basis upon which to base social distinctions - the obvious
exception being the female role in reproduction. Well, one may rightly ask at this point:
What is so bad about that? If our purpose is to eliminate sex-based discrimination, then
isn't prohibiting the use of sex-based distinctions an obvious remedy?
The answer is the problem with the uncritical incorporation of background facts
into liberal political theory.24 What is taken as pre-political background facts are often
the result of power relations, and so these very facts are shaped by power and inequality.
To take them as neutrally defining untainted categories is to already take a position on
gender and one that MacKinnon argues reflects and reinforces male power. Moreover,
this conception of rationality will almost never allow gender-based distinctions in law,

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

See generally Laden, supranote 17.
Id. at 138.
Id.
Id. at 139.
See generally id.

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol46/iss1/7

6

Watson: Toward a Feminist Theory of Justice: Political liberalism and Fem

2010

TOWARD A FEAINIST THEORY OFJUSTICE

41

and on MacKinnon's view much of the work of getting sex equality for women will
require acknowledging the social reality of gender - that is, acknowledging gender as
hierarchical. On the liberal model, the use of race and gender is morally permissible that is, "with good reason" - only if race and gender are non-arbitrarily related to the
purpose for which they are invoked as grounds. Showing that the grounds connect to the
purpose involves showing that the group in question - racial group or gender group is picked out on the basis of a "real" difference. The problem, then, is that what counts as
a "real" difference is often the product of power relations or real inequalities. So, the
liberal approach to discrimination, for example, counts as discrimination the use of
morally irrelevant facts - i.e., failing to adequately map the background facts-as
related to the group in question. Thus, .the harm of discrimination on this model is
treating an individual arbitrarily - i.e., differently - in comparison to others, when
there is no "real" reason for the difference in treatment.
"JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS" AND POLITICAL LIBERALISM

Tony Laden argues, convincingly I think, that political liberalism is unique among
liberal approaches in that it rejects rationality as objectivity as an appropriate model of
political justification. 25 Political liberalism's approach to the problem of political
legitimacy is well situated to reject rationality as objectivity insofar as it constructs a
theory of reasonable political deliberation in which the concept of reciprocal agreement
is the normative core. Reciprocity demands that when we come together to determine the
terms of social cooperation (including principles of justice, but also their scope and
application), we must offer reasons to one another that we can accept as free and equal
citizens - and Rawls himself emphasizes that this entails that no one be dominated or
manipulated or under the pressure of an inferior social position.26 A theory of reasonable
political deliberation entailed by political liberalism's account of political legitimacy
requires that fair background conditions must be secured for all citizens to participate in
public deliberation as free and equal citizens. Thus, political liberalism is committed to
eradicating unequal social conditions (including those rooted in hierarchical social
identities) that serve to thwart the possibility of reciprocal agreement among citizens.
And, as I have argued elsewhere, this shift provides ground from which to move toward
a feminist political liberalism. 27 This sketch of a reply may serve to show that political
liberalism doesn't fall prey to one set of concerns raised by MacKinnon's critique of
objectivity, yet, this doesn't provide a complete answer.
Rawls, and a number of those who endorse his brand of liberalism, are not only
just committed to political liberalism as an account of political legitimacy, but they are

25. See generally Laden, supra note 17.
26. Rawls, The Idea ofPublic Reason Revisited, in RAWLS, supra note 8, at 573, 578.
27. See Lori Watson, ConstitutingPolitics: Power, Reciprocity, and Identity, 22 HYPATIA 96 (2007); Lori
Watson, Pornographyand Public Reason, 33 Soc. THEORY & PRAc. 467 (2007). Also, I develop this approach
further in my work with Christie Hartley. See Christie Hartley & Lori Watson, Feminism, Religion and Shared
Reasons: A Defense of Exclusive PublicReason, 28 L. & PHIL. 493 (2009); Christie Hartley & Lori Watson, Is
Feminist PoliticalLiberalismPossible?, 5 J. ETHICS & Soc. PHIL. 1 (2010).
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also committed to Rawls's defense of "justice as fairness."28 Justice as fairness refers to
the particular principles of justice as well as the methodology for arriving at them,
familiar from Rawls's earlier work in A Theory of Justice.29 Let us briefly review the
procedure Rawls defends for determining the principles of justice as well as their
content. Rawls argues that the principles of justice are those that would be chosen by
self-interested rational deliberators as representatives of free and equal persons in an
impartial choice situation. This "original position" is intended in part to model a social
contract approach to justice - namely, just principles for organizing society are those
that could or would be agreed to by persons in an initial position of equality. To ensure
fairness, representatives in this original position lack knowledge about their particular
circumstances and place in society. Thus, such representatives are imagined to be behind
a "veil of ignorance" in which they do not know their race, sex, religion, economic
status, particular skills and attributes, and other social factors that might bias their
deliberations. Thus, the methodology here requires both high level abstractions away
from actual conditions and idealizations (i.e., deliberators are supposed to be rational and
self-interested). Rawls argues that the original position with the conditions imposed by
the veil of ignorance captures what we mean by "the moral point of view."
[T]he procedure whereby principles are proposed and acknowledged can be take to
represent the constraints of having a morality; it is these constraints which require rational
and self-interested persons to act reasonably, in this case, to acknowledge familiar
principles ofjustice.
Rawls's methodology requires strong idealizations. It is not simply that he relies
upon normative values (ideals), something that every theory of justice must do. It is that
the procedure for determining the principles of justice requires that we abstract away
from concrete particulars/facts (of our current conditions, etc.) and imagine counterfactuals in which the antecedents are empirically false (e.g., if persons were in a relative
position of freedom and equality, rational, self-interested, then they would choose X, Y,
Z), and those principles are to guide our actions and institutions here and now with very
different antecedents (historical domination and subordination of some groups over
others). Admittedly, Rawls aims to develop principles of justice for a "well ordered
society" - a society in which there is strict compliance with the principles of justice and
a public justification of such principles that everyone accepts. Thus, the principles he
articulates in justice as fairness are not themselves designed to, nor intended to, address
systemic injustice. In this sense, Rawls is engaged in ideal theory rather than non-ideal
theory. As Charles Mills aptly describes the distinction:
[W]hat distinguishes ideal theory is not merely the use of ideals, since obviously non ideal
theory can and will use ideals also (certainly it will appeal to the moral ideals, if it may be
more dubious about the value of invoking idealized human capacities). What distinguishes
ideal theo is the reliance on idealization to the exclusion, or at least marginalization, of
the actual.
28.
29.
30.
31.

See RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 9.

Id.
John Rawls, Justice as Reciprocity, in JOHN RAWLS: COLLECTED PAPERS, supra note 8, at 190, 201-02.
Charles Mills, "Ideal Theory" as Ideology, 20 HYPATIA 165, 168 (2005).

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol46/iss1/7

8

Watson: Toward a Feminist Theory of Justice: Political liberalism and Fem

2010

TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OFJUSTICE

43

In Mills's view, and in the view I am defending here, this form of ideal theory
often functions in an ideological fashion in abstracting away from the actual conditions
of inequality and injustice, an understanding of which is necessary for proper theorizing
about justice. So, does this approach to justice embody the "male point of view" or the
"objective stance" in the way that MacKinnon has argued serves to shield and perpetuate
inequality, specifically the inequality of women? Recall that her criticism of the liberal
state includes a criticism of the way in which it claims to arrive at principles of law
(justice) from an aperspectival and distanced approach, when in fact it reflects the male
point of view. Also recall that in her description of the feminist method, theorizing
justice requires understanding the particular forms of injustice we have faced and
continue to face, as women or as blacks or as gays or as lesbians, and so on. So, although
political liberalism as an approach to political legitimacy may side step these criticisms,
they may resurface at the level of methodology adopted for formulating principles of
justice within political liberalism, specifically within justice as fairness.
Particularly problematic is that Rawls's methodology asks us to abstract away
from relations of domination and subordination (including chattel slavery, the
domination of Europeans over non-Europeans, the domination of men over women, for
example) and asks: assuming domination is not a part of the fabric of our social lives,
what would persons under conditions of relative freedom and equality choose as
principles to regulate their conduct and social intuitions? In light of MacKinnon's
critique of male power, we might say here that Rawls asks the wrong questions when it
comes to theorizing justice, and the point of view that is supposed to be definitive most
closely reflects the social position of white males historically. But, more importantly,
Rawls's deliberators in the original position are not persons who have themselves been
subjected to pervasive injustice and subordination, and they are not asked to consider
what justice would require from the perspective of the oppressed. Eva Feder Kittay, for
example, criticizes Rawls's approach to theorizing principles of justice as the
idealization of the persons whom the representatives in the original position are
representing. These persons are assumed to be fully and normally cooperating members
of society over time.32 Idealizing persons in this way theoretically shields questions of
dependency (and inevitable human fragility) at the level of design.33 In contrast to this
methodological approach, MacKinnon (and many others) argues that the perspective of
social subordinates is necessary for an accurate understanding of the injustices routinely
faced on the basis of their group membership. And in turn, knowing the forms of
injustice is crucial to remedying such injustice. For example, consider here MacKinnon's
critique of dominant sex equality approaches. 34 Looked at from the imagined perspective
of free and equal citizens (un-gendered persons, where no one is dominated or
subordinated), Aristotle's formulation of equality - treat likes alike and unlike unalike
- seems perfectly reasonable. Absent a critique of the way in which social power serves
to construct differences, and in turn naturalizes them, we will miss the ways in which
such a conception of equality perpetuates inequality.
32. See EVA FEDER KITTAY, LOVE'S LABOR: ESSAYS ON WOMEN, EQUALITY, AND DEPENDENCY (1999).
33. Id. at 79-82. Thanks to Christie Hartley for this point.
34. See MACKINNON, SEX EQUALITY, supra note 19, at 3-56.
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Now, if we reject the methodology of justice as fairness for determining principles
of justice, where does this leave us vis-A-vis political liberalism? It is quite possible to
defend political liberalism and reject justice as fairness, both in its methodology and in
its specific formulation of principles of justice. After all, even Rawls acknowledges that
once we embrace the idea that political legitimacy requires a political conception of
justice and with it a commitment to public reason, it is clear that there can be a range of
reasonable political conceptions of justice. 35 Rawls, of course, thinks justice as fairness
is among them, and in fact "the most reasonable." 36 But one need not follow Rawls this
far.37 The key normative concept for political liberalism is the reciprocity condition namely, that political principles are legitimate only insofar as they are reasonably
justifiable to those to whom they apply. In my view, reciprocity entails a principle of
non-domination, from which it follows that the state must adopt political principles and
policies that serve to dismantle socially hierarchical identities through which social and
political power are distributed unequally. In short, reciprocity as non-domination
requires a substantive conception of equality. And MacKinnon has forcefully argued that
developing a substantive conception of equality- and hence aiming at justice requires theorizing from the perspective of the dominated; in short, it requires a feminist
method. Political liberals would do well to heed this call in developing and a political
conception of justice, but they must first recognize the limits of "justice as fairness."

35. Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, in RAWLS, supranote 8, at 573, 582-83.
36. JoHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM at xlvi (2d ed., 2005).
37. Notably, Martha Nussbaum identifies herself as a political liberal yet rejects justice as fairness,
defending instead a capabilities approach grounded in a conception of human dignity.
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